Meaning of Intentionality

Intentionality to Maurice Merleau-Ponty differs from Husserl's concept. To Merleau-Ponty, intentionality is not first and beginning(a) a matter of what the thinker thinks about the reject, scarce quite a matter of the thinker's ability to per counterfeit the articulation of his or her thought about the physical object lens, thought which when articulated "moves" the thinker toward the object (180). This movement takes place for Merleau-Ponty not in the mental lay out but in the body. To Husserl, the "body" is merely another object existing certainly only in the mental act, but to Merleau-Ponty, the thinker's relationship to the physical earth is expanded by the comprehension of the body and the body's movement toward objects in the world: "the irreducible and foundational form of intentionality is that which is involved in one's ability to act on the world" (180).

Unlike Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre agrees with Husserl's understanding of intentionality. However, Sartre seems to interject to a more bleak conclusion with delight in to the wall which intentionality places between the thinker and the object in the world: "The tree escapes me and repulses me, and I quite a little no more lose myself in the tree than it can give the sack itself in me [i.e., in his consciousness]. I'm beyond it; it's beyond me" (98).

To the phenomenologist, intentionality is important because it is the focal point for understanding

Instead, what Husserl aims at with respect to the reality of any subject outside of one's consciousness is initiative rather than certainty: "Husserl observes that one experiences the world as a world which admits of other perspectives. This is all one needs in order for knowledge of the origination of an inter-subjective world to be likely" (219-220).

Scientific realism: rejected by the phenomenologist because it bases its definition of reality and existence on the evidence observed, gathered and analyzed by the physical sciences. Scientific realism rejects "the way the world is experienced in everyday perception [i.e., the very essence of phenomenology] as 'mere appearance.

'" It distinguishes between "two 'worlds', of private experience and public objects" (3).

The divergence of the Fifth Meditation . . . is spent in establishing that this other self-importance experiences the same world one experiences oneself, that it coexperiences the same inter-subjective world. This coexperience, Husserl claims, is implicit in one's experience of others and of the world, and so it can be revealed by phenomenological description. . . . adept apperceives the other as having a different perspective, but a perspective on the same world (218-219).

Still, the phenomenologist Husserl does not come to any apodictic (incontrovertible) conclusion with respect to the intersubjective world. This is not of necessity a flaw in Husserl's philosophy, however, because phenomenology as conceived by Husserl does not have the intention of arriving at such incontrovertibility.

Transcendence: in phenomenology, the process whereby possibilities are opened in which the ego can be transcended so that it can know something of the nature and existence of other egos and the outside world. "A feature of the 'objects' of experience, of what is experienced, and these objects are superior in that they 'go beyond' . . . any particular experience" (34).

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